strategic thinking on territorial disputes in northeast asia-凯发总代

　　disputes over territorial sovereignty are one of the most difficult and challenging problems in transnational relations. it also explains why most states involved in territorial disputes adopt the policy of keeping it low key and shelved. but the territorial disputes in northeast asia have undoubtedly broken this diplomatic norm. japan has been deliberately escalating the diaoyu islands dispute and using it as an excuse to revise the constitution of peace, which has become the most typical example of the severe consequences brought by the failure of foreign policy. what deserves our vigilance is that japan may set a bad example in dealing with the dispute in northeast asia. once this kind of negative “japan model” is proliferated, the territorial disputes might become igniter for regional security crisis and bring about the full reversal of regionalization process.

　　the absence of strategic analysis in the discussion of territorial disputes in northeast asia 

　　it is not accidental that the territorial disputes in northeast asia have become more and more prolonged and complicated. it is an inevitable reflection of the unique historical background, political and military environment and complex interest entanglement of the region. based on the different perspectives, people generally attribute the frequent territorial disputes in northeast asia to the following three factors.

　　an important feature of northeast asia is that the alliance system left by the cold war cannot solve the various problems caused by unbalanced development among nations. 

　　the first is related to the historical factors and the entailing expansion of nationalist forces. the territorial disputes in northeast asia are not only legacy of history, but also related to the complex factors in international relations after the wwii. the dokdo island dispute was originated from the policy of invasion and annexation of the korean peninsula by japan after the meiji restoration. the diaoyu islands were usurped by japan during the first sino-japanese war of 1894-1895 and should have been returned to china according to the cairo declaration. the dispute between russia and japan over the kuril islands was originated from the dispute among allies over the arrangement of japanese territories after the wwii. the combination of territorial issue and historical acrimony has stimulated the nationalist emotion of countries concerned, and provided the important legitimate basis for the nationalist forces to frequently interfere in the country’s foreign policy.

　　the second factor is related to the imbalance of political structure and lack of regional mechanism in northeast asia. an important feature of northeast asia is that the alliance system left by the cold war cannot solve the various problems caused by unbalanced development among nations. after the end of the cold war, the us-japan and us-rok military alliances have remained in place, but the reorientation of alliance is very ambiguous. the appeals of the emerging countries including china and russia cannot be voiced or answered through an institutional channel, while the internal friction among the us, japan and the rok has been intensified because of the disappearance of a common enemy. the northeast asia does not have a regional cooperative platform encompassing all the regional countries, so the regional economic cooperation, peace and security are relied more on the tacit understanding and compromise among major countries like china and the us. with the rise and fall of national strength of the us, china and russia, this kind of compromise is being replaced by the pursuit of “dominance”.

　　the lack of regional regime, rules and mutual constraints will increase the possibility of territorial dispute-incurred crisis, and will weaken the institutional channel that the parties concerned can ask for help once the crisis broke out.

　　the third factor is about the linkage between territorial disputes and other sensitive issues. unlike many other countries that would detach the sensitive territorial issue from other issues, certain northeast asian country tends to use the territorial issue to realize other political ambition. this trend has become more obvious after the year of 2010. the abe shinzo administration linked the disputes over the dokdo, the kuril islands and the diaoyu islands with the sensitive issue of japan becoming a “normal” state, attempting to promote the political status of japan in east asia and the world at large. for a country like this, the territorial dispute is not only a big trouble, but also a tool to curb the rise of other country’s influence and rebalance the regional power structure. this, in turn, aggravates the complexity of solving the territorial issue. if more countries view the territorial dispute as an opportunity or tool to realize other strategic goals, and have the speculation of taking advantage of the crisis, one can expect the tough response of the other party concerned and inevitable turmoil in northeast asia.

　　admittedly, the historical factor, structural pressure or the approach of using territorial disputes as means of pressure have all played an important role in the surging territorial disputes in northeast asia. however, to transform these pressures into specific foreign policy behavior, the strategic factor is indispensible. whether it is the external structural pressure or the domestic historical memory and national mood, it can only be turned into state behavior by specific strategic planning and policy implementation.

　　however, the excessive narrow interpretation of strategic concept has led to the absence of a grand strategy in the diplomatic practice in the territorial disputes in northeast asia. the strategic review based on the narrow-sensed diplomatic process have been viewed as equivalent to testing each other’s bottom line, testifying one’s own bottom line, analyzing the possible support to the adversary and one’s own potential allies; predicting each other’s policy orientation and searching for the means of constraint. in this sense, the connotation of strategy is more or less similar to that of tactics or skills, and the strategic interaction is oversimplified as a process of testing each other’s bottom line, taking initiatives and adopting counter-effective policies.

　　a conspicuous feature of territorial disputes in northeast asia is that the emotional or sentimental factors are involved in various disputes. 

　　if the strategic analytical framework is so structured, it will face the problem of providing interpretation of the current affairs not persuasive enough, whether it is in the field of policy review or diplomatic practice. first of all, the territorial sovereignty issue has a nature of zero-sum game, and there are not many successful cases to learn from for the settlement of the disputes. if one focuses on strategic analysis of the territorial disputes per se, he will fall into either the cycle of competition for toughness, or long-term deadlock. secondly, the international strategy is a macroscopic and systematic decision-making process. the territorial issue is an important component, but there are many other different factors and their interaction may have a greater influence on the final solution of the territorial issue. these factors include the position of territorial dispute on the overall national strategic layout, how and to what extent the various domestic variables like nationalist force, bureaucracy and politicians exert influence on state policy, on which ground the government adopts certain policy from different options and how is the cost of each policy option, whether the media, public opinion and foreign policy department have different value priorities in the interpretation of disputes.

　　the strategic interpretation of territorial disputes in northeast asia 

　　the regional economic cooperation in northeast asia has reached a rather high level. the territorial disputes, however, have constantly been intense, which is not at all normal. it manifests that there must be something missing in the regional strategic environment. so what kind of grand strategy will aggravate the territorial disputes? a complete strategic review framework should comprise three parts including strategic philosophy, strategic concept and strategic mechanism.

　　1. the value-attached strategic philosophy 

　　there are numerous historical precedents that the strategic planning supposed to bring peace had in fact contributed to the escalation of conflict. 

　　a conspicuous feature of territorial disputes in northeast asia is that the emotional or sentimental factors are involved in various disputes. it can be seen in two dimensions. on the one hand, the media, agitated population and conservative politicians were united together and had taken a strong moral stance. the territorial issue in this circumstance was upgraded to an absolute “right vs. wrong” or “good vs. evil” problem, which greatly reduced the space for compromise and negotiation. on january 26th, 2014, in his interview with the wall street journal, abe shinzo clearly stated that japan can contribute to the world peace by balancing the power of china in asia, and he equated the tough stand of japan on the diaoyu islands with his “proactive contribution to peace”. under the guidance of this strategic philosophy, any tough and uncompromising stand of the japanese government is justified in an absolute and transcendental manner when value is involved. this has kept the china school in the japanese administration in silence and the adventurist policy of the hardliners less constrained. the strategic philosophy is supposed to provide sufficient room for the policy implementation, but the pre-set moral stand has made the strategy rigid to a great extent.

　　there are numerous historical precedents that the strategic planning supposed to bring peace had in fact contributed to the escalation of conflict. it shows that only when the value orientation of a country’s international strategy is inclusive enough, can it be helpful to the policy practice in specific circumstances. the more diversified the policy options based on reality are, the more likely the abstract value and principles can be realized. it is dangerous to leave the international strategic philosophy manipulated by sentiment and emotions. the focus on value will lead directly to the absence of strategic reasoning. the parties concerned will gradually find that they are using similar languages to expound their respective stand and accuse the other party to be responsible for the conflict. the functional negotiation tool will be decreasing and extinct.

　　2. the lack of cost concept in strategic concepts 

　　the strategic philosophy cannot be translated to the policy implementation directly. it has to be first interpreted as some concrete guiding principles and then summarized into a series of problems deserving special attention. after that, it may have influence on the specific policy adoption. this intermediate level is where strategic concept works. at present, the strategy concept that disrupts greatly the countries’ policy options is the misunderstanding of concept of strategic cost by some countries.

　　the territorial dispute is an issue that its gain incurs far less sensitivity than its cost. since every party concerned believes that the disputed territory belongs to himself and no one else, it will bring no surprised pleasure to reclaim the disputed territory, while it can bring real sense of crisis when the disputed territory cannot be recovered or controlled, or its sovereignty is otherwise claimed. on the one hand, the radical nationalist and conservative forces perceive the other party’s strategic resolve and competence of realizing that resolve in an unserious manner, and firmly believe they can achieve the goal by tough measures. on the other hand, a rigorous assessment of strategic cost is absent. almost everybody is unwilling to discuss the cost openly and stresses only on gains. they are especially reluctant to emphasize on the cost of the longterm confrontation, for fear of causing public concern or being accused of cowardice.

　　since the territorial disputes have long been limited, there can be wide-spread illusions in many countries, believing that the status quo will stand without further deterioration. “the bilateral political relations turning cold while the economic relations remaining warm” do not bring alarm to politicians in certain countries. these politicians hope the economic relations will remain sound for a long time despite the sour political relations, and they just presume this act to please the conservative force will not backfire. believing so, they will act even more recklessly, not taking full consideration of the negative consequences of the instigated public opinion.

　　3. the arrogation of strategic coordination mechanism by political authority 

　　compared with the territorial disputes in other parts of the world, where the countries concerned would conduct active diplomatic mediation, resort to regional or international organizations to resolve the sensitive dispute, the territorial disputes in northeast asia are unique in a sense that the political leadership in certain countries would come to the forefront in the crisis and see the proradicalist stand as chips to prolong his political life. since neither party in the dispute would back up easily, the open and frequent comments by political leaders would further narrow the not-solarge game space for each party, and rarely bring extra honor to the political leaders. it can even trigger the conflict that could have been avoided because the political leaders are unfamiliar with the situation. in many countries in northeast asia, technocrats are not adequately authorized in dealing with the territorial disputes and can not maintain long-term stable and cooperative relations with their foreign counterparts. instead, they often have to endorse or take responsibility for what the politicians have done.

　　it should be noted that the present situation in northeast asia goes against the trend of international strategic development. generally speaking, the latest development in modern international strategic thinking has seen less reliance on genius strategist and relied more on complete communication system and decisionmaking scheme. according to the understanding of max weber, the foreign policy institution controlled by technocrats can effectively reduce the random political maneuver by the politicians and the short-term diplomatic operation affected by votes. the clear hierarchical structure, division of functions, rules and regulations and impersonal organization and management in the administration system will provide stable, verifiable and adjustable operational path for the strategic decision-making and implementation. of course, the bureaucratic system has its defects, since most bureaucratic institutions are good at day-to-day business management instead of creative strategic construction. however, these defects are not serious enough to have us downplay the role of foreign policy institution in resolving territorial disputes in northeast asia.

　　there is a substantive distinction between territorial disputes and other types of international conflict, with a zero-sum nature at its core. therefore, the key to assuage this kind of disputes lies in how to keep the communication unobstructed, how to prevent the incident from escalating into major crisis and how to establish the mutually cooperative mechanism to “extinguish the fire”. no diplomatic mechanism dealing with territorial disputes can be unilateral, it requires long-term diplomatic cooperation, tacit understanding and coordination by the parties concerned. it also requires the maximum non-intervention of personal sentiment. in these circumstances, the weakening of authority of government ministries in charge of foreign relations, foreign trade and maritime affairs as well as that of transnational cooperation mechanism can be extremely dangerous and may even lead to the prolongation and deterioration of diplomatic crisis.

　　however, the strategic interaction in northeast asia is anachronistic, with the decreasing of credibility and influence of the japanese bureaucracy as a typical example. some politicians have tried to take the place of technocrats by applying their own self-appointed talents and personal style. they also tried to replace the existing cooperation channels with the solo dance by political leaders.

　　as a country with a rather complete bureaucratic structure in northeast asia, japan goes farthest in sabotaging strategic coordination mechanism. when the kuril islands incident broke out, the japanese ambassador to russia kawano masaharu was sidelined and could only do some patch work. he was nevertheless forced to step down from office. in contrast, foreign minister seiji maehara had incessantly made stimulating comments on the kuril islands issue since taking office, but could do nothing when russian prime minister dmitry medvedev arrived at the islands. he remained intact after the incident. the reduced role of professional dialogues controlled by technocrats has become the weakest point in the territorial strategy of northeast asian countries. since pm abe shinzo took power in japan, he has been manipulating the public opinion more frequently and has put himself at the forefront of territorial disputes with china and the rok. it may help abe shinzo win popular support in the short term. however, it encourages the conservative or militaristic politicians to be more fanatic in the long run, which may keep japanese foreign policy stuck in a predicament of “pursuing bismarck-style authority without the talents of bismarck” as described by mr. henry kissinger.

　　in today’s northeast asia, a few self-acclaimed politicians has taken too much power, while the technocrats are marginalized and deprived of their independence, or even the aspiration and capability to maintain long-term cooperation with their foreign counterparts. the institutional guarantee is missing in strategic coordination of the conflicting parties, leading to the lack of authority of bilateral and multilateral strategic cooperation mechanisms. the existing dialogues can be terminated or made ineffective by certain conservative politicians at any time.

　　the basic conditions for establishing strategic agenda concerning territorial disputes 

　　when there is no significant progress in the international and regional cooperation, it is hard to have a breakthrough on the territorial issue in a narrow framework. in general, three conditions have to be met to reach a new cooperative strategic consensus:

　　it is a common phenomenon in modern political environment to avoid talking about cost. 

　　first, the position of territorial disputes in the country’s overall strategic framework has to be clearly defined. the sovereignty and territorial integrity is undoubtedly one of the core national interests. but whether the international strategic goal can be completely equated with the core national interests? the nature of international strategic goal lies in its “simplicity and conciseness”, which implies that the international strategy can be effective for only a limited duration of time. the core national interests may last as long as there is the nation state, while a strategic planning may be reasonable for just several decades. when there are many core interests to be protected by the country demanding for huge resources input, to formulate a strategy means that the legitimately authorized central government has to decide where to put the limited resources during a certain period of time on behalf of the whole nation. in this sense, a right strategy must be consistent with the national interests in the long run, while it may be conflicted with the protection of certain core national interests during its life span. when faced with the wide-spread territorial disputes and thinking about the policy options, the governments in northeast asia should ask “what is the position of disputed territory in the country’s overall international strategy”, instead of “whether the sovereignty and territorial integrity are the core national interests”.

　　second, the countries concerned must have the correct understanding in their ability to bear the cost in the territorial disputes. the standards to judge the maturity of a grand strategy, which has great influence on the country’s future, include not only whether it is reasonable in goal or feasible in practice, but also whether it is bearable in cost. it is a common phenomenon in modern political environment to avoid talking about cost. however, if the cost is not estimated in advance, its affordability and rationality will not be verified, and the “cost evasion” or “damage control” will not be discussed. therefore, a country must have two abilities: the first is the ability to recognize, calculate and evaluate the most cost effective way in a multiple target system; the second is the ability to accept and bear the cost or even the sacrifice. the resolving of the territorial disputes may lead to high-intensity conflict like military confrontation or conflict, the countries concerned must give a comprehensive review of medium-and-long-term risks and cost of a certain strategy, while have a careful consideration of short-term cost of deterrence and confrontation.

　　since there is no cost-free strategy, no country should expect a “panacea” strategy. when the governments declare to the public its strong determination to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity, they should also tell the public the cost the country may have to pay. it is a necessary choice to keep the citizens fully informed, as well as the most effective way to prevent the national grand strategy hijacked by extremist values. in the current geopolitical structure of northeast asia, territorial issues should not have been the foreign policy priority for any country, because any radical or hard-line measures will not overhaul the status quo, and may bring potential harm since other countries may follow suit and counterbalance. some right-wing politicians stir up the controversy and support the hard-line policies, not intending to oppose the regional peace and cooperation, but believing luck is on their side and the hard-line policies will not go beyond the border of breaking regional cooperation. they even presume that the other countries are more in need of peace or cooperation. this kind of behavior is in nature a refusal to face the cost and is very shortsighted when examined from the strategic perspective, it will do no good to resolving the problem, and will reduce the space for policy options.

　　third, the role of the professional institutions on the territorial issue should be reshaped and the regional strategic coordination mechanism should be strengthened. when the world economic growth is still sluggish and the economic and social development prospects in northeast asian countries are not very clear, there is a basic consensus among regional countries in maintaining and expanding the political and economic cooperation in the region. however, due to the development of domestic political situation, the bureaucratic authority in russia, japan and the rok are weakened to some different extent. the competition between the central and local governments, among different parties and interest groups has made the foreign policy power becoming gradually diversified. to be clear, any international strategy must take into account of all aspects of domestic interests and opinions. the debate and power game on international strategy is by no means wrong, and quite contrarily, it helps to enhance the reasonability and representativeness of international strategy. however, the current dispute over some islands in northeast asia does not fall into the category of strategic adjustment, because those politicians and the force behind them who stir up the controversy have no sincerity to review and debate the national strategy and the regional strategic situation. they only want to realize their narrow domestic and international interests by exaggerating individual issues and inciting public opinion. this phenomenon is most conspicuous in the interaction between the local government of tokyo and the democratic party cabinet in japan on the issue of “nationalization” of the diaoyu islands. this kind of obvious arrogation of power of professional institutions, under the disguise of nationalism and patriotism, would finally deal a serious blow to the government authority, and weaken the ability to implement medium-and-longterm national strategy.

　　in order to re-create the appropriate atmosphere for regional dialogue and cooperation, some country needs to go through a serious review of strategy formulation mechanism. this means first to restrain domestic conservative voice, and to have politicians, public opinion and professional institutions play their respective due roles. according to roderick e. white, the transformation of strategic decision making and implementation starts with the cognitive restructuring, dialogue process and responsibility adjustment of the strategic management system (including the informal organizations). when the media together with the conservative politicians create turmoil, professional institutions enjoy more abundant, comprehensive and detailed information and intelligence, more professional and objective stance and opinions in the relevant field. however, their objective voice cannot be fully heard and become the will of state. that’s because, on the one hand, the information, opinions, technologies and personnel in different departments and institutions are not integrated, and their relative separation from each other prevents them from having a unified will and stand, and reduces their influence at both social and political levels. on the other hand, the civil service in east asian countries as represented in japan and the rok, is often stuck in the old administrative tradition, and lacks the habit and skill to communicate with the common folks (especially radical nationalists), thus unable to find an overlapping point of view between the bureaucracy and the society. a truly effective mechanism of strategic dialogue should not only accommodate the voices from the traditional professional institutions in charge of foreign trade, national defense or fishery affairs, but also promote the exchange of information and point of views among publicity departments, civil society, think tanks and other social media. only in this way can we truly ease the emotions and radical attitude in each country and create a quiet and relaxed atmosphere for diplomatic coordination.

　　from the view of regional strategic coordination mechanism, the governments need to reestablish the leading role of professional institutions as represented by the foreign ministries and departments in the dispute over territorial sovereignty, to protect the invaluable technical and diplomatic communication channels established over time from the radical media and to create a fairly quiet and interference-free environment for the communication among professional diplomatic personnel. having examined the international coordination over territorial disputes and various sensitive issues in northeast asia, we find that only diplomatic channels can be independent to some extent and can keep longterm mutual communications despite the specific controversies, and only this kind of transnational communication mechanism can play the “balancer” role in a major crisis to create the necessary space for major strategic compromise.

　　conclusion 

　　historical experience of resolving territorial disputes in all parts of the world shows that the disputed territory itself has neither the strategic depth nor sufficient maneuvering space. it is hard to make any progress when solely focusing on resolving the territorial issue. only when the complicated territorial issue is placed in the country’s macro-strategic framework and reviewed in accordance with the overall strategic layout and trend, can the territorial issue become not the huge obstacle to the national and regional development. how to keep the territorial issue in a controllable and appropriate place has posed a great challenge to the strategic vision and planning ability of northeast asian countries. the hope to resolve this issue lies in looking far into the future and building more consensuses.

　　yu haiyang is associate professor at college of public administration, jilin university.